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Perhaps more than any other political phenomenon, incumbents’ capture of 
political institutions through the manipulation of the rules of the electoral game has 
commanded the attention of scholars of the law of democracy in recent years.1  Of 
course, the phenomenon is not new, nor is scholarly or judicial preoccupation with it.2  
However, whether the subject is gerrymandering,3 campaign finance reform,4 ballot 
notations,5 primary election rules,6 ballot access7 or any number of other exertions of 
state power to organize and sculpt the legal environment for elections, the question 
recently has been: How can we develop institutions and constitutional rules that prevent 
those in charge from using their power to insulate themselves from competition? 
For many, this has led to an espousal, if not glorification, of the institutions of 
direct democracy (initiative, referendum and recall) as critical and important safeguards 
against  incumbent entrenchment.8  Under this view, direct democracy allows for an end-
run around incumbents, allowing the median voter in a jurisdiction to enact institutional 
                                                 
1 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard 
H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 25 (2004). 
2 See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1981). 
3 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L . REV. 593 (2002); Nathaniel 
Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002). 
4 See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n 540 U.S. 93, ___ (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
5 Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533 
(1999). 
6 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, 
and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001); Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The 
Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 88 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001); Nathaniel Persily, 
Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750 (2001). 
7 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1; Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political 
Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (2000). 
8 Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY 
L. REV (forthcoming 2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 239 (2004). 
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reform seen as against the interests of political insiders who have clogged up the 
“channels of political change.”9  By allowing voters to redesign electoral rules, the 
initiative process has the potential to rein in dominant parties seeking to hobble their 
opponents and to control cartelist behavior of incumbents that disadvantages outsiders.  
Of course, as many have observed, the initiative process is hardly a tool used exclusively 
or principally by the dispossessed or powerless.   Insiders, too, can use this alternative 
means of policy making to achieve their goals.10  Nevertheless, while recognizing that the 
more and less powerful might exploit the tools of direct democracy, at least such 
alternative means of policy change remain an option for outgroups in the initiative states.  
Therefore, it might follow that certain types of laws – that is, those types of laws likely to 
be favored by voters and disliked by incumbents – should be more prevalent in such 
states where the initiative is an option.  This paper attempts to test this hypothesis. 
In particular, we hope to explore whether certain types of election regulation 
appear more often in initiative states than non-initiative states.  In so doing, we attempt to 
build on the work of Caroline Tolbert, whose initial efforts to answer this question 
predicted and found evidence that initiative states are more likely to pass certain 
“governance policies” – that is, “procedural reforms that constrain the autonomy of state 
legislatures, change the ‘rules’ that state and elected officials must follow, and restructure 
political institutions.”11  Like others who have tried to study this problem, however, we 
                                                 
9 ELY, supra note 2, at 103. 
10 See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI., 
99, 99-128 (1992). 
11 Caroline J. Tolbert, Changing Rules for State Legislatures: Direct Democracy and Governance Policies, 
in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 171 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 
1998).  
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run into the problem of defining the scope of our project – worrying that an overly 
narrow approach could be written off as preoccupied with the politics of a specific issue 
(e.g., redistricting) or that an overly broad approach glosses over greater variation among 
the loosely defined category of laws we analyze.  Figuring that more is better than less 
and that our goal at this stage is as much to promote further research as it is to present our 
own interpretation of the data, we have opted for the mile-wide-inch-deep approach since 
we suspect that different readers will be interested in different types of reforms.  We 
therefore attempted the daunting task of gathering data on as many election law reforms 
as possible.  The reforms analyzed in this paper include term limits (both for governor 
and state legislators), commission-based redistricting, public funding of campaigns, 
campaign contribution limits, primary election structures for state legislative elections 
and presidential nominations, women’s suffrage, state legislative malapportionment prior 
to Baker v. Carr12 and the installation of the direct primary. 
Because we canvass a broad array of laws in this area, we necessarily arrive at 
some complicated conclusions.  In Part I we present the aggregated data for each reform.  
The first task we set for ourselves was to discover whether certain types of election laws 
are more prevalent in states with direct democracy.  Indeed, we find that some types of 
reforms, such as term limits, are more prevalent in initiative states, while most others, 
such as certain types of campaign finance regulation, are not.  In the aggregate, we were 
struck by how similar – in general and at this rough level – initiative and non-initiative 
states were; however, we recognize that not all initiative states are created equal and that 
                                                 
12 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 
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coarsely grouping the states based on an on-off toggle for presence or absence of the 
initiative fails to capture important differences between initiative states.  In some states, 
the barrier to placing a measure on the ballot are very low and political actors use the 
initiative process quite frequently, while in many other states the initiative option is 
available but rarely used.  We therefore modified Caroline Tolbert’s distinctions about 
general initiative usage13 to characterize initiative states further as “frequent users,” 
moderate users,” and “infrequent users,” but were once again surprised to find few 
differences among the states and measures we analyzed. 
Because a simple frequency distribution depicting the prevalence of a particular 
reform does not explain how the state passed the law, however, we also considered 
whether the initiative states passed each of these reforms through the initiative process14 
or through normal legislative means.  Here we find considerable variation among the 
laws we analyze.  For the most part, however, we find that initiative states in fact pass 
many of these reforms through normal legislative means, rather than through the 
mechanisms of direct democracy. 
Having surveyed the lay of the land, we turn in Part II to a more in depth 
explanation of why initiative states may have adopted certain election law reforms.  In 
particular, we try to answer the question whether some legislatures pass election reforms 
                                                 
13 Tolbert, supra note 11, at 180.  We used the same principle, the average number of measures appearing 
on a ballot in a certain state divided by the number of years that state has had the initiative process, and 
modified it to accommodate reforms isolated in certain decades.  For example, the usage measures for 
women’s suffrage and the direct primary measure usage through 1920; the measure for pre-Baker v. Carr 
apportionment calculates usage through 1960.  Calculations for all other reforms, as they are relatively 
contemporary or span a large period of time, reflect usage through 2000. 
14 Ballot initiatives in this study include only those sponsored by citizens or citizen groups; measures 
sponsored by legislatures or government organizations are excluded. 
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out of fear of a voter initiative on a similar subject or simply because the legislators 
themselves favor such a reform.  Of course, each new reform – however passed in a given 
state – usually arises from a unique impetus in the populace and/or the legislature.  Some 
legislatures pass a law because of the threat of an initiative, others because it is in the 
dominant party’s self interest, and still others because legislators genuinely believe the 
election reform, like any law, is justified as good public policy.  We have therefore 
attempted to comb through the available legislative histories and contemporaneous 
sources to get a sense for whether and when legislatures have reacted to the initiative 
threat.  When the data are available, we also do our best to examine failed election law 
initiatives in order to discuss why certain reformist dogs did not bark even when given 
the chance. 
In Part III we examine older election law controversies – specifically, the extent 
and history of malapportionment in states before Baker v. Carr, the adoption of women’s 
suffrage, and the adoption of the direct primary.  Adoption of the institutions of direct 
democracy sometimes coincided with the adoption of several of these structural reforms, 
and at other times preceded them.  Together they constituted components of a Progressive 
vision of institutional change that sought to transfer power from captured legislatures and 
corrupt party machines and toward the people. 
In Part IV we present our conclusions.  We arrive at a tentative conclusion that for 
certain reforms that legislators, as a class, are likely to disfavor are more likely to be 
passed in initiative states.  The voters may go around their elected representatives to pass 
such anti-incumbent laws or legislators might attempt to take the wind out of the sails of 
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an initiative effort by passing a similar law.  However, we recognize that not all election 
reforms threaten legislators equally and in some cases, a seemingly anti-incumbent 
reform, when passed by the legislature or placed by a legislator on the ballot, takes a form 
that promotes, rather than threatens, incumbents’ interests.  Therefore, the anecdotal 
evidence we present here may be more valuable than the aggregate findings, insofar as it 
conveys the general theme that the presence of the initiative process might make some 
reforms more likely. 
Embedded within that tentative conclusion are a large number of caveats.  First, 
we recognize that not all initiative states are created equal, nor are specific types of 
reforms.  In other words, state laws vary with respect to the ease with which a voter can 
place something on the ballot (such as the number of signatures required), and each of the 
election law reforms we explore represents a rough grouping of laws that can vary 
considerably with respect to the severity of their intrusion on elections.  For the most 
part, we identify here the presence or absence of a reform (e.g., term limits) without 
examining the nature of the reform (e.g., how severe the term limits restriction is), the 
reasons the sponsors placed the measure on the ballot or even who those sponsors were.  
We also do not investigate, in any systematic way, instances in which courts strike down 
election reform initiatives or legislatures hijack initiatives by amending them after the 
fact.15  These constitute serious drawbacks, which we hope subsequent research will 
remedy.  That being said, we think much can be gained even from the rough cut of the 
data we present here – whether or not it proves or disproves any particular hypothesis – if 
                                                 
15 See ELISABETH GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE. 
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for no other reason than the fact that we discovered trends in the data that we did not 
originally expect. 
 
I. Do Initiative States Have Different Election Law Regimes? 
 
Figure A displays the frequency distribution for certain election laws in initiative 
and non-initiative states.  As mentioned above, we examine the following election 
reforms: term limits affecting governors and state legislators, commission-based 
redistricting, public funding of campaigns, campaign contribution limits, and primary 
election structures for state legislative elections and presidential nominations.  There is 
considerable variation among the laws we cover in terms of whether differences exist 
between these categories of states.  While there are a handful of policies that initiative 
states have adopted more often, most such reforms appear with relatively equal frequency 
in initiative and non-initiative states.  Only legislative term limits and commission based 
redistricting seem to be much more prevalent in initiative states than in non-initiative 
states.  For most of the other reforms there appear not to be any significant differences 
with respect to the frequency of a certain law between the two categories of states, and 
for two – non-legislative term limits and pre-1920 women’s suffrage – a greater share of 
non-initiative states appear to have adopted the given reform. 
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Figure A.  Reform Measures Achieved By Availability of Initiative Process
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 We make a further distinction among initiative states by the frequency of 
initiative use, as shown in Figure B.  This distinction is important because the 
institutional parameters regulating the use of the initiative process in each state, as we 
mentioned, vary widely, and can significantly affect the success of initiative campaigns.  
Thus, we might expect that, to the extent the initiative process is related to election law 
reform, states with higher initiative use, for whatever reason (a progressive culture, loose 
institutional parameters, etc.) might be more likely to adopt election law reforms.  As the 
states are relatively evenly distributed among the three categories, high usage, moderate 
usage, and low usage,16 the absolute numbers used below are instructive.  While in many 
cases, such as term limits, campaign contribution limits, and pre-1920 women’s suffrage, 
higher initiative usage characterizes the states that have enacted reforms, we do not 
observe any strong systematic patterns. 
                                                 
16 Of the 24 states that currently have the initiative process, Caroline Tolbert has identified eight as “high” 
users, nine as “moderate” users, and seven as “low” users.  See supra note 11. 
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Figure B.  Initiative States Only: Number of Reform Measures Achieved By Usage of the Initiative Process
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 In order to establish whether the presence of the initiative process affects the 
likelihood that a state will adopt a particular reform, it would be helpful (though not 
dispositive) to know whether initiative states passed these election reforms through the 
initiative process or through legislative action.  As presented in Figure C, here we find 
even greater variation among the laws in our study; some provisions more than others 
appear particularly likely to being passed by initiative.  Initiative states have passed 
legislative term limits only through the initiative process, for example, whereas all public 
funding programs for non-legislative elections and most efforts to establish equal 
suffrage for women and commission-based redistricting were passed through normal 
legislative means. 
 
 10
 
Figure C.  Among States with the Initiative Process, Mechanism Used to Achieve Reform
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Note: We have not yet been able to find complete data concerning the origination of provisions creating presidential and non-presidential nominating systems.  As such, we have excluded them from this chart.  
 The tendency to pass election reform through the initiative process might not be 
uniform among initiative states, however.  In other words, perhaps some initiative states, 
because of history, culture or the strategies accepted and perfected by parties and interest 
groups, are more likely to use the initiative process for election reform.  As Figure D 
indicates, we find limited support for that proposition.  Those states with high or 
moderate usage of the initiative process were somewhat more likely than low usage states 
to use that process to pass election reforms, but the differences between the states are not 
dramatic. 
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Figure D.  Initiative States Only: Number of States Using the Initiative Process for Reform
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II. Contemporary Case Studies 
A. Term Limits 
Of the laws we analyze, legislative term limits represent the most severe intrusion 
on the interests of individual legislators.17  We should therefore expect initiative states to 
be more likely to pass such limits, given that legislators in non-initiative states would 
generally be unwilling to curtail their career options.  In fact, as existing research has 
documented, with the exception of one state, state legislative term limits exist only in 
states whose voters have the initiative process available to them.18  Moreover, in those 
states, the initiative process has been the only successful avenue for reform. 
 
                                                 
17 Tolbert, supra note 11.  
18 U.S. Term Limits, State Legislative Term Limits, at 
http://www.termlimits.org/Current_Info/State_TL/index.html. 
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Table 1. States Imposing Term Limits on State Legislators
Among Initiative States, How Achieved?
Term Limits on Legislators Initiative Legislative Existed in % through
Status of Initiative Yes No Total Process Action Constitution Initiative
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 5             3             8             5                    -                 -                100%
     Moderate Users 7             2             9             7                    -                 -                100%
     Infrequent Users 3             4             7             3                    -                 -                100%
Total Initiative States 15          9            24          15                -               -               100%
Non-Initiative States 1            25          26          -               1                  -               
Total 16          34          50           
 
In Louisiana, one of two states whose legislature adopted such limits (Utah’s 
limits, as discussed shortly, were adopted and then repealed), strong public agitation for 
the reform prompted state legislators in 1995 to approve a state constitutional amendment 
to limit its own terms.19  Several legislators asserted that the public’s support for the 
measure inspired the bill: “I think term limits are not the way to go, but I felt after due 
consideration that people in this state and in the country are looking for term limits and I 
should give them a chance to vote on it.”20  The amendment was approved in a voter 
referendum later that year by a margin of 3:1.21
While the legislature did approve the constitutional amendment to be sent to the 
voters, it protected itself somewhat by declining to pass limits that would take effect in 
the ensuing few years.  Ultimately, the provision in Louisiana, compared to all states with 
                                                 
19 Statewide Constitutional Amendments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1995, at A4; Term 
Limits for Louisiana Now Up to the Voters, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15, 1995, at A1; Term 
Limits Movement in the Louisiana Legislature, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Nov. 18, 1994, at 9B. 
20 Term Limits for Louisiana Now Up to the Voters, supra note 14, at A1 (quoting former Senate President 
Samuel Nunez). 
21 Louisiana Secretary of State, Results for Election Date 10/21/95, at 
http://www.sos.louisiana.gov:8090/cgibin/?rqstyp=elcms4&rqsdta=102195. 
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legislative limits, will have seen the most years pass before it takes effect in 2007.  Apart 
from Louisiana’s adoption of term limits through the legislative process, though, which 
was spurred by the success of the national movement and state level public sentiment in 
favor of reform, the overwhelming message from the legislative term limits movement is 
that it was successful because of the availability and use of the direct initiative.  Indeed, 
we should emphasize the uniqueness of the legislative term limits movement that swept 
through initiative states in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Although one might consider 
term limits to be the paradigmatic case of a citizen-favored, legislator-opposed measure 
ripe for passage through the initiative process, the presence of a unique, well-funded, 
ideologically motivated movement, as well as a desire to use the initiative process, 
distinguish term limits from the other reforms we analyze. 
As a point of comparison, we have also investigated the adoption of gubernatorial 
term limits laws.  While many gubernatorial term limit provisions exist in state 
constitutions and date back to the 1800s, other states passed them during a less 
concentrated reform movement that spanned the second half of the twentieth century.  As 
the table above shows, 36 states currently have laws restricting the number of terms its 
governor can serve.  Of these, more than half, or twenty, exist in states in which the 
initiative process is not available.22  Among the sixteen states that have gubernatorial 
term limits that also have the initiative process, only one state (Utah) achieved them 
through the legislative process.  The remaining fifteen, or 94%, used the initiative to 
install term limits, as shown on the left side of the following table: 
                                                 
22 U.S. Term Limits, State Gubernatorial Term Limits, at 
http://www.termlimits.org/Current_Info/State_TL/gubernatorial.html. 
 14
 
 
Table 2. States Imposing Term Limits on Governors
Among Initiative States, How Achieved?
Term Limits on Governors Initiative Legislative Existed in % through
Status of Initiative Yes No Total Process Action Constitution Initiative
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 5             3             8             5                    -                 -                100%
     Moderate Users 7             2             9             7                    -                 -                100%
     Infrequent Users 3             4             7             3                    -                 -                100%
Total Initiative States 15          9            24          15                -               -               100%
Non-Initiative States 20          6            26          -               11                9                  
Total 35          15          50           
 
 
Even in Utah, the statutory term limits measure, which applied to both legislators and to 
governors, was passed by the legislature while a strong grassroots movement was 
underway; the sponsor noted that the measure was “absolutely ridiculous”, but then 
“conceded it was better than limitations imposed by grass-roots petitions now circulating 
among voters.”23  The indirect pressure of the initiative process, then, was sufficient to 
spur the legislature to action.  When it did, the grassroots movement died away, and a 
competing measure that was presented on the ballot later that year failed.  The legislature 
had the last laugh the following year: in March of 2003, it repealed the law. 
In contrast, though, many legislatures in the states without the initiative, shown at 
the bottom of the previous table, were the vehicle for gubernatorial term limits.  Of the 
twenty states that have term limits on governors that were established without the 
                                                 
23 Ethics-Reform Bills Buried in Utah’s Legislative Grave, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 3, 1994, at A1. 
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availability of the initiative process, nine of them were cemented in place with the 
adoption of the state constitution.  The remaining eleven were enacted through 
constitutional amendments that were approved through the legislative process.24   
 The comparison of legislative and gubernatorial term limits laws highlights the 
central position of the legislature as the potential choke point for election reform 
legislation.  Whereas several legislatures have been willing to limit the terms of the 
governor, only one has subjected its own members to term limits.  Moreover, the term 
limits movement is unique in its exploitation of the initiative process.  With only one 
exception, the initiative states that have term limits for either governor or state legislature 
got them through the initiative process.  As will become clear, however, term limits exist 
at the far end of the spectrum.  For no other reform is the importance of the initiative and 
the recalcitrance of state legislators so clear. 
 
 
B. Commission-Based Redistricting for State Legislatures 
 
In an effort to promote competition and the election of moderate representatives, 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has threatened to place an initiative on the California 
ballot that would transfer authority over the redistricting process from the legislature to a 
commission composed of retired judges.  This move, as well as the widespread 
                                                 
24 Based on information available at http://www.termlimits.org. 
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frustration in many states (let alone among law professors25) concerning low levels of 
competition for Congress and state legislatures, has reinvigorated interest in creating 
institutions dedicated to removing incumbent protection and partisan greed as the 
principal motivations behind the redistricting process.26  Insofar as unchecked 
redistricting power allows dominant legislative parties or cartels of legislators to act in 
ways contrary to voters’ perceived interests, we might expect initiative states to be more 
likely to pass redistricting reform.  We therefore examined which states have transferred 
power over the redistricting process from the legislature to a commission of some sort.  
Of course, we recognize that commissions come in many forms – some are the primary 
means of redistricting, others exist merely as a backup in case the legislature fails to pass 
a plan, and in still other states the commission’s plan is merely advisory.27  Moreover, we 
also recognize that in some states, depending on how the members of a redistricting 
commission are appointed, commissions might constitute mere proxies for the dominant 
party of a legislature or for a bipartisan cartel.28   
With these caveats in mind, however, we still might expect initiative states to 
attempt to increase the distance between linedrawers and those whose careers their efforts 
would most likely affect.  In other words, insofar as the normal process of legislation 
gives legislators the greatest potential control over the redistricting process (not an 
                                                 
25 See Issacharoff, supra note __.  
26 See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AMER. 
POLIT. SCI. 541, 543 (1994) (“Any good politician knows the consequences of letting the opposition party 
draw the district boundaries . . . on average, redistricting favors the party that draws the lines more than if 
the other party were to draw the lines.”). 
27 Distinctions among categories of redistricting commissions have been difficult to make.  Commissions in 
states such as Iowa, for example, can be overruled by the legislature although the commission still retains 
control over the submission of subsequent plans.  For the purposes of this section, we have used the 
distinctions by the National Council of State Legislatures. [confirm] 
28 See Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses, supra note 3. 
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uncontestable claim to be sure), we would expect greater variation with respect to the 
institutions in control of redistricting in initiative states.  Indeed, as the table below 
indicates, we find a relationship suggesting just that. 
Table 3. States Using Redistricting Commissions for Legislative Redistricting
Type of Commission Use Commission?
Status of Initiative Primary Advisory Backup Subtotal Yes None Total
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 4               -            1               5               5               3               8              
     Moderate Users 4               -            -            4               4               5               9              
     Infrequent Users 1               1               2               4               4               3               7              
Total Initiative States 9                1                3                13              13              11              24             
Non-Initiative States 3                2                2                7                7                19              26             
Total 12              3                5                20              20              30              50              
 
Redistricting commissions, used in some capacity in twenty states, are almost 
twice as common in states that have either the constitutional or statutory initiative process 
than in those that do not.  In particular, nine of the twelve states that use commissions as 
the primary institution for redistricting are initiative states.  However, as the table below 
indicates, most laws transferring power over redistricting to commissions were not passed 
(or even pursued) through the initiative process among initiative states:  legislatures in six 
of the nine initiative states that use commissions voted to cede their redistricting 
authority.  With that said, all three states that have used the initiative process to institute 
commission-based redistricting are high-usage states. 
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Table 4. How States with the Initiative Process Adopted Redistricting Commissions
How Commissions Were Adopted: By Type of Commission
Primary Advisory Backup Total
Status of Initiative Initiative Not Init. Initiative Not Init. Initiative Not Init. Initiative Not Init.
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 3           1           75% -        -        1           -        100% 4            1            80%
     Moderate Users -        4           0% -        -        -        -        -        4            0%
     Infrequent Users -        1           0% -        1 0% -        2           0% -        4            0%
Total Initiative States 3            6            33% -        1 0% 1            2            33% 4            9            31%  
 
 
Only four states, Arkansas in 1936, Oklahoma in 1962, Colorado in 1974, and 
Arizona in 2000 were successful in transferring control over redistricting to authorities 
through direct constitutional initiatives; three other states, Oklahoma in 1960, North 
Dakota in 1973 and California in 1990, attempted to install redistricting commissions 
through the initiative process and failed.29  In the remaining seventeen states that use 
commissions, ten of which are initiative states, legislative action established them.  Even 
though states with the initiative process available are more likely to have commissions, in 
most cases they did not get them through the initiative process. 
 Why is this the case?  What prompted legislatures in states such as Missouri, 
Arkansas, Washington, and Ohio - all of which have the initiative process and also use 
independent commissions as the primary agent for redistricting – to cede control over the 
state legislative redistricting process?  For example, Washington’s adoption of the 
independent commission, we suspect, was prompted by a combination of a tradition of 
                                                 
29 Initiative and Referendum Institute, Statewide Initiatives Since 1904-2000, at 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Historical/State
wide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf (Feb. 11 2004). 
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progressivism and the threat offered by the initiative.  In 1981, the state legislature 
experienced considerable difficulty with the congressional reapportionment process as 
the governor vetoed the legislature’s first plan and a federal court panel invalidated the 
second, spurring intense partisan bickering over the ensuing few years as the legislature 
struggled to create a new map.  At the same time, while the state legislative redistricting 
plan created by the legislature was approved with relative ease, minority Democrats’ 
complaint of partisan gerrymandering coincided with a citizens’ group’s filing of an 
initiative to require an independent commission to redistrict state legislative boundaries.30  
The following year, a competing amendment emerged from the state legislature that 
transferred authority of all redistricting, congressional and legislative, to an independent 
commission, and was approved by the voters in the fall of 1983.31  In Washington, at 
least, the legislators seemed willing to relinquish control over an onerous, knotty process, 
particularly when they could pre-empt a competing measure emerging from the public. 
 
C. Campaign Finance Reform 
In the jurisprudence and scholarship concerning campaign finance reform, a 
healthy debate exists concerning whether certain types of reform favor incumbents.  
Because challengers to incumbents are often poorly funded and incumbents already enter 
a race with name recognition that only money could otherwise buy, reformers often seek 
measures with the intention of equalizing the electoral playing field.  We examine here 
                                                 
30 Spellman Vetoes, Signs Parts of Redistricting Plan, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 18, 1981, at ___. 
31 See http://www.redistricting.wa.gov/; see also 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/redistricting2/1980s/1982/1982_courtCases.aspx. 
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two types of campaign finance reform: public funding and contribution limits.  
Proponents of public funding (usually accompanied by spending limits) often see it as a 
way of closing the spending gap between incumbents and challengers, and advocates of 
contribution limits often hope that doing so will curtail the fundraising advantages of 
incumbents.  On the other hand, opponents of such reforms also worry that any limits on 
campaign funding activity necessarily help incumbents because challengers need all the 
money they can get in order to compete with the natural advantages all incumbents share. 
By analyzing the frequency of certain reforms in initiative and non-initiative 
states we had hoped to shed light on this controversy.  Perhaps if only initiative states 
passed such reforms we might conclude that they were, by nature, anti-incumbent  or pro-
competition.  Given that these two groupings of states do not appear to differ in any 
systematic way with respect to campaign finance reform, we cannot add much to the 
underlying debate.  However, anecdotes from particular states suggest that the presence 
of the initiative option often leads to the enactment of campaign finance reforms 
specifically disfavored by incumbents. 
 
1. Public Financing 
 
Laws that provide public financing to candidates for elected office exist in 27 
states32 and vary considerably in form.  Differences in the amount of money provided, the 
                                                 
32 Benjamin Wyatt, Origins of State Public Financing of Elections: A Comprehensive Database of State 
Public Financing Systems (2002) (B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University), available at 
http://www.octobernight.com/bwyatt/add1.htm.   
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source of that money, how and when it is distributed, and how a candidate qualifies for it 
make any systematic evaluation of these laws somewhat challenging.  When they were 
adopted, public financing laws were expected to facilitate quality challenges to 
entrenched incumbents by equalizing the availability of funds for challengers’ 
campaigns.  In retrospect, there is not much evidence that this has been the case; research 
suggests that public financing is irrelevant to the outcome of state legislative elections33 
except when the funds available are particularly high,34 and some scholars even assert 
that the availability of public funds, while narrowing the spending gap, has neither 
increased the competitiveness of elections or the number of challengers that choose to 
run.35
While public financing may not have a negative impact on incumbents, it is still 
possible that the perceived effects of the reform influence legislators’ attitudes toward 
reform when they consider it.  So long as legislators anticipate that the effects of public 
financing laws would be detrimental, we might expect the initiative process to be 
influential to the adoption of the reform.  Alternatively, legislators in favor or indifferent 
to public financing regimes may nevertheless be reluctant to pass them out of fear that 
voters might consider incumbents as voting to subsidize their own campaigns.  As with 
other types of reforms that legislators might consider electoral risks, making tax dollars 
                                                 
33 ALEXANDER, HERBERT E.  REFORM AND REALITY: THE FINANCING OF STATE AND LOCAL CAMPAIGNS.  
NEW YORK: TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND PRESS [DISTRIBUTED BY THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
WASHINGTON, D.C.], 1991. 
34 Patrick D. Donnay & Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections: Lessons from 
Minnesota,” 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 351, 351-364 (1995). 
35 Kenneth R. Mayer & John M. Wood, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: 
Evidence from Wisconsin, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 69, 69-88 (1995). 
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available for candidate campaigns may be one of those issues over which legislators 
would prefer to pass the buck to the voters. 
As depicted below, public financing laws for any number of state offices exist in 
27 states, but public funding for state legislative campaigns exist in only seven states.36  
No differences appear between initiative and non-initiative states with respect to their 
propensity to pass public financing reforms for either legislative or some other office. 
 
Laws Providing for Public
Financing, by Office
State Other State No Public
Status of Initiative Legislators Office Financing Total
Initiative States 4                9                11             24             
     Frequent Users 1               2               5              8              
     Moderate Users 2               5               2              9              
     Infrequent Users 1               2               4              7              
Non-Initiative States 3                11              12             26             
Total 7                20              23             50             
% Initiative States 57% 45% 48% 48%  
 
 
 The initiative process does appear to be used more frequently for legislative 
public funding regimes than for other state offices.  In the following table, note that, of 
the thirteen state-level public financing laws that exist in initiative states, only three were 
installed through the initiative process, and all three of them, evenly distributed among 
                                                 
36 Wyatt, supra note 26. 
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usage categories, fund state legislative campaigns.  In contrast, legislatures (not voters) 
passed all nine public funding programs for non-legislative offices in initiative states  
 
 
 
Table 5. States with Public Funding Provisions for Statewide and Legislative Campaigns
Public Financing: Non-Legislators Public Financing: State Legislators
How Passed? How Passed?
Status of Initiative Yes No Total Initiative Not Init. Yes No Total Initiative Not Init.
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 2             6             8             -          2             1             7             8             1             -          
     Moderate Users 5             4             9             -          5             2             7             9             1             1             
     Infrequent Users 2             5             7             -          2             1             6             7             1             -          
Total Initiative States 9            15          24          -        9            4            20          24          3            1            
Non-Initiative States 11          15          26          3            23          26          
Total 20          30          50          7            43          50           
 
As noted above, legislators’ propensity to pass public funding regimes only for 
offices other than their own is consistent with several hypotheses, any of which may be 
true for the individual cases we list here.  Perhaps legislators fear that public funding 
would help their potential opponents or they consider such reforms too controversial, 
such that they preferred to pass the buck to the initiative process.  Or perhaps, as with any 
initiative, public funding may simply be one of those issues, which legislators do not 
view as a priority but which a concerted group of voters can successfully place on the 
ballot before a receptive public. 
 
2. Contribution Limits 
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Contribution limits exist as probably the most popular form of campaign finance 
reform, as well as perhaps the easiest to understand.  As discussed above, a considerable 
debate exists concerning such limits’ oft described anti-incumbent or pro-competitive 
effects.  Of course, the potential forms of a contribution limit are as varied as the tactics 
used to evade them.  States may ban or place various types of limits on contributions 
from different entities, such as individuals, political action committees, political parties, 
corporations, unions, and out-of-state citizens.  Like public financing laws, limits on 
campaign contributions vary extensively in type, amount, and parameters for 
enforcement.  We concentrate here on the presence or absence of limits on individual 
contributions to candidate campaigns.  For the purposes of this study, we were 
particularly interested in the propensity of legislatures or voters to adopt such limits.  As 
the following table shows, limits on contributions to state legislative campaigns exist 
nearly equally among initiative states as in non-initiative states. 
 
Contribution Limits on No % with
Limits * Individuals Limits Total Limits
Initiative States 18           6             24           75%
     Frequent Users 6            2            8            75%
     Moderate Users 8            3            11          73%
     Infrequent Users 4            1            5            80%
Non-Initiative States 19           7             26           73%
Total 37           13           50           
* All laws in this portion of our study apply to state legislators.  
 
 25
 
Moreover, among the states with contribution limits in which the initiative process exists, 
just over half were introduced using the initiative process, mostly concentrated among 
high and moderate initiative users:37
 
Table 6.  Limits on Contributions by Individuals to Candidates for State Legislative Offices
Limits Exist? Average Limits, by Office Contribution Limits: How Passed?
Initiative Status Yes No Total % Assembly Senate Initiative Legislation Total % Init.
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 6        2        8        75% 1,149$     1,411$     4 2 6            67%
     Moderate Users 7        1        8        88% 693$        764$        3 4 7            43%
     Infrequent Users 4        4        8        50% 2,450$     2,450$     2 2 4            50%
Total Initiative States 17     7       24     71% 1,333$    1,448$    9           8           17         53%
Non-Initiative States 19     7       26     73% 1,442$    1,883$    
Total 36     14     50     1,498$    1,721$    
Difference (109)$     -8% (435)$     -23%  
 
If we want to get a better grasp on the effect of the initiative process on the 
likelihood of passage of contribution limits in general or low limits in particular, we need 
to know more about the types of limits passed and the political struggles (if any) that led 
to their passage.  We do not engage in a systematic analysis here, except to point out in 
the table below the data comparing the average severity of contribution limits for state 
                                                 
37 The average limits recorded in this chart are derived from Federal Election Commission data and refer to 
limits on individual contributions to candidates for state legislative offices in a given year.  To the extent 
the state law distinguishes between general and primary elections, these limits apply to general elections.  
To the extent the state law distinguishes between election years and non-election years, these limits apply 
to election years.  These data do not take into account further restrictions by election cycle on aggregate 
individual contribution limits.  The entry for Rhode Island, which has less restrictive limits for candidates 
qualified to receive public funding, assumes the candidate has not qualified for public funding.  The entry 
for New Hampshire, which has less restrictive limits for candidates who voluntarily limit their 
expenditures, assumes the candidate has not voluntarily agreed to limit expenditures.  See Edward D. 
Feigenbaum and James A. Palmer, Campaign Finance Law 2002: A Summary of State Campaign Finance 
Laws with Quick Reference Charts Chart 2-A (2002), available online at 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02chart2a.htm (last visited Jan 31, 2005) (compiling state laws 
regulating campaign contributions). 
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legislators in the initiative and non-initiative states that have adopted contribution limits.  
On average, initiative states have set lower contribution limits than non-initiative states: 
about $400 lower (23%) for contributions to races for a state’s lower house and about 
$100 (8%) lower for state senate races.  Of course, this relationship might be spurious or 
due to other factors such as the size of a state’s population or economy, and we cannot 
say that the presence of the initiative process itself caused these differences.  We have not 
yet found a dataset that explains which limits were passed by initiative, so we cannot test 
our strong intuition that the average initiative is probably more restrictive than the 
average piece of campaign finance reform legislation. 
Beyond the summary statistics though, we are awash in anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that in particular states the presence of the initiative was essential to the 
passage of certain contribution limits.  In some cases voters rallied behind and passed 
initiatives seeking to change the permissive limits established by the legislature.  In 
others, legislators bowed to pressure from a threatened initiative.  In still others, the 
legislature voted to raise limits set by a previous initiative.  Here are just a few 
examples38:  
 
• Missouri:  In 1994, citizens gathered signatures for a measure to set $100 
contribution limits for legislative races.  In an attempt to head-off the 
initiative, the legislature passed $250 contribution limits.  The initiative 
was placed on the ballot went to the ballot anyhow, winning.  The Eighth 
Circuit rejected those $100 limits, so the legislative limits of $250 went 
into effect.  They were then adjusted for inflation to become $275, and 
then those limits too were voided by the courts.  The Supreme Court then 
                                                 
38 We are indebted to Derek Cressman, Director of www.therestofus.org, for these examples. 
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reviewed the limits and reinstated them in the Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC.39 
 
• California: A 1996 initiative established a $500 contribution limit for state 
legislature and $1000 for statewide office.  A 2000 legislatively referred 
ballot measure repealed prop 208 and established much higher limits 
($3000 legislature, $20,000 for governor). 
 
• Colorado: A 1996 initiative set contribution limits of $100 for legislative 
races and $500 for governor.  The legislature then raised the limits to 
$1000 per 2 year cycle for House, $1500 for Senate, and $5000 for 
governor in 2000.  In 2002, voters went back and by initiative passed a 
constitutional amendment setting limits of $200 per election for legislative 
races and $500 per election for statewide races.  
 
• Alaska:  The legislature passed a law for $500 legislative contribution 
limits in 1996 only after threatened by citizens filing 30,000 signatures to 
qualify an initiative that would have set lower limits.  In 2003, the 
legislature doubled these contribution limits.  In 2004, citizens submitted 
36,000 signatures to qualify an initiative for the 2006 ballot to take them 
back down to $500. 
 
• Oregon: In 1994, voters passed an initiative to set $100 limits on 
legislative races, which the Oregon courts later threw out under the state 
constitution. Citizens have filed (but not yet qualified) a constitutional 
amendment to allow for contribution limits for the 2006 ballot. 
 
• Montana: In 1994 citizens passed an initiative to set $100 limits for 
contributions to legislative candidates.  Despite several attempts, the 
legislature has not successfully increased those limits. 
 
• Arkansas: In 1996, voters approved an initiative to lower contribution 
limits from $1000 to $100 for legislative races, but the courts later struck 
it down.    
 
• Massachusetts: In 1990, the legislature enacted $500 contribution limits, 
but only after citizens had gathered signatures for a ballot question. 
 
• Ohio: In late 2004, the Ohio legislature passed a law to radically increase 
their contribution limits from $2500 to $10000.  Citizens are threatening a 
referendum to repeal this law. 
 
                                                 
39 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
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 These examples illustrate the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process 
on campaign finance reform.  Although the data may not suggest a robust effect at first 
glance, for certain states direct democracy has been an indispensable avenue of success 
for outside reformers blocked by recalcitrant legislatures.  Moreover, once the legislative 
logjam breaks in initiative states (either because the voters act themselves or legislatures 
pass such reforms) they tend to adopt stricter limits than non-initiative states.  At the 
same time, most legislatures in non-initiative states, as is true for the federal government, 
have also acted on their own to establish contribution limits. 
 
 
D. Nomination Systems 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones,40 
striking down California’s “blanket primary” initiative, law professors have spilled a lot 
of ink debating a party’s First Amendment right of expressive association implicated by 
state regulation of primaries.41  In Jones the Court clarified that a state (which includes a 
majority of voters acting through the initiative process) violates a party’s First 
Amendment rights when it forces the party to include nonmembers in its primary.  
Advocates of reforms, such as the blanket primary, see them as shifting power away from 
party leaders and the party faithful and toward the median voter in the electorate, perhaps 
also spurring competition in the process.  The picture such advocates paint is one of a 
                                                 
40 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
41 See Garrett, Is The Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Issacharoff, 
Private Parties With Public Purposes, supra note 6; Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political 
Party Autonomy, supra note 6; Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, supra note 1. 
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largely moderate electorate held hostage by extremist partisans who stand in the way of 
reform of the nomination process and who have no incentive to change the primary 
system that for most districts represents the dispositive election.  Although the Jones 
decision blunts possible anti-party innovation by way of the initiative process, 
investigating whether systematic differences as to primary systems exist between 
initiative and non-initiative states can give us some idea as to whether incumbents may 
have historically held up more open nomination systems.    
We examine here nomination systems for both state legislature and for 
nominating the President.  The principal difference between the two systems is that some 
states hold caucuses, instead of primaries, for President, and in a few states, the rules are 
different for Democrats and Republicans.  Although an infinite number of nomination 
systems potentially exist, we have divided systems into four general categories to get a 
sense of the trends in the states we analyzed: 
• Closed primary – Only party members can vote in a 
party’s primary. 
• Semi-open Primary – Party members can only vote in 
their party’s primary but independents can choose any 
party’s primary ballot. 
• Open primary – Anyone, regardless of party affiliation 
or non-affiliation, can vote in any party’s primary.  
This includes states that do not keep track of or do not 
require party affiliation, and states that have a blanket 
primary where voters can switch party primaries for 
each office. 
• Caucus – A gathering of voters in a town hall style 
meeting in order to nominate a candidate. Caucuses can 
also be open or closed.  No state has a semi-closed 
caucus. 
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We began an examination of the data presented in this section without a clear 
hypothesis to test.  On the one hand, consistent with the drama surrounding California’s 
experiment with the blanket primary, perhaps we should expect initiative states to be 
more likely to have open primaries because the median voter can act (or threaten) through 
the initiative process to ensure a greater degree of choice or openness in a primary 
election.  If we assume that party stalwarts are more likely to want to close their 
primaries to non-members and that party organizations can more easily execute such 
restrictions through their alter egos in the legislature, then we should expect non-initiative 
states to have closed primaries.  On the other hand, voters in initiative states may not 
necessarily want to open up their primaries, nor might party leaders in non-initiative 
states necessarily prefer closed systems.  Perhaps the preferences of voters or legislators 
is more a function of state-based idiosyncrasies as to whether parties want their nominees 
to cater to a broader electorate at the primary stage.   
As the tables below indicate, we find almost no difference between initiative and 
non-initiative states with respect to the openness of their primary systems for either state 
legislative or presidential elections.   Indeed, the two classes of state appear almost 
identical.42  The only differences worth noting is a somewhat larger number of initiative 
states (six out of twenty four as opposed to four out of twenty-six for non-initiative 
states) that employ caucuses for nominating presidential candidates, and the fact that 
                                                 
42 The data for Presidential nominating processes refers to the rules of the 2004 Democratic Party primary 
or caucus for each state, but the differences between the parties are not so substantial that they would 
change our conclusions.  We have used older data for the state legislative primaries because we wanted to 
capture the state of the world before California Democratic Party v. Jones made forcing a blanket primary 
on parties unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, updating the data to 2004 also would not change our 
conclusions.  
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frequent users of the initiative seem somewhat more likely to have closed primaries than 
infrequent users.  However, we consider the remarkable similarity between these states to 
be more significant than these small differences.  
 
Table 7.  State-Level Nominations by Availability of the Initiative, as of 1990
Nomination Process
Closed Semi-Open Open Total
Status of Initiative Process
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 5 1 2 8             
     Moderate Users 2 2 4 8             
     Infrequent Users 1 0 7 8             
Total Initiative States 8            3            13          24            
Non-Initiative States 8            4            14          26            
Total 16          7            27          50             
 
Table 8. Distribution of Presidential Nominating Systems by Status of the Initiative Process, as of 2004
Primary Election Caucus Primary and Caucus Systems
Closed Semi-Open Open Total Closed Open Total Closed Semi-Open Open Total
Status of Initiative Process
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 4 1 1 6 0 2 2 4 1 3 8
     Moderate Users 3 1 4 8 1 0 1 4 1 4 9
     Infrequent Users 0 1 3 4 2 1 3 2 1 4 7
Total Initiative States 7              3             8            18          3       3       6        10       3            11     24     
Non-Initiative States 10            3             9            22          1       3       4        11       3            12     26     
Total 17            6             17          40          4       6       10      21       6            23     50      
 
 We were also surprised to discover how frequently legislators introduced bills 
concerning who can vote in a primary election.  From 2001-2004 legislators from thirty 
states introduced 87 bills that would have opened up their states’ presidential primary to 
independent voters or to voters of the opposing party.43  However, only five such 
                                                 
43 National Conference of State Legislatures, Database of Election Reform Legislation, supra note 38.  
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proposals became law.  Even fewer initiatives were proposed.  By our count only 
California and Washington have passed initiatives seeking to change their primary 
systems.  California’s experiment with the blanket primary ended with the Jones 
decision, as mentioned above, but just this past year the voters shot down a proposed 
initiative for a non-partisan primary, in which the top two vote-getters of any party in the 
primary move on to the general election.  However, the voters approved such a measure 
in Washington, which for the previous sixty-seven years had employed a blanket 
primary.44
 
 
III. Early Examples of Electoral Reform  
 In this Part we turn back the clock to look at early election reforms and the effect 
(if any) that the initiative process may have had on their enactment.  In addition to 
highlighting the relationship of different Progressive Era reforms to each other, by taking 
this look back we hope to get some sense as to whether electoral reform initiatives (or 
threats of them) may have been more prevalent or effective in earlier years and whether 
initiative states as a group may have behaved differently at the time they instituted direct 
democracy.  En route to examining those phenomena, we should admit a drawback to 
some of the analysis presented previously:  issues such as term limits, campaign finance, 
                                                 
44 See Chuck Taylor, A Washington Primary Primer, SEATTLE WKLY., Dec. 1-7, 2004, available at  
http://www.seattleweekly.com/features/0448/041201_news_primary_primer.php.   After Jones, the parties 
in Washington successfully challenged the blanket primary.  The Legislature then passed a law instituting a 
non-partisan primary, which was vetoed by the Governor.  A back-up bill instituting an open primary for 
the 2004 elections received the Governor’s signature.  However, the voters passed the nonpartisan primary 
initiative in the November general election.  See id; Washington Secretary of State, History of the Blanket 
Primary in Washington, at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/bp_history.aspx. 
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and redistricting reform have only been “issues” for the past thirty years or so.  
Legislative term limits, in particular, and the movement that used the initiative process so 
skillfully to have them instituted are creatures of the late 1980s and 1990s.  Thus, 
preoccupation with these trendy reforms could skew conclusions as to the independent 
effect of the availability of the initiative process election reform generally. 
 In this section we analyze the potential role the initiative process played in 
instituting the direct primary, women’s suffrage, and pre-Baker v. Carr redistricting.  The 
first two measures, plus direct election of Senators and direct democracy,45 represented a 
family of Progressive and Populist reforms that existed as a program for broadening 
political participation and moving power away from captured legislatures or party 
bosses.46  We run into a problem in analyzing the relationship of direct democracy to 
these other Progressive Era reforms because states instituted them in a relatively short 
time frame as part of a coherent package of reforms.  Moreover, eventually all states 
instituted women’s suffrage, the direct primary and direct election of Senators so the 
most we can analyze is whether those states with the initiative process were first to move 
on these issues and whether they used the initiative process to pass these reforms.  In 
general, we find few differences between initiative and non-initiative states and rare 
instances where voters used the initiative process to pass such reforms. 
 Pre-Baker redistricting is a bit more complicated.  By comparing degrees of 
malapportionment and last date of redistricting among initiative and non-initiative states 
                                                 
45 In a footnote, we analyze direct election of Senators before the Seventeenth Amendment. See infra note 
__. 
46 See generally Nathaniel Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL. REV. 11 (1997). 
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we had hoped to get some sense of whether the people tended to rise up against 
malapportioned legislatures when the law allowed it.  We find some differences between 
initiative and non-initiative states but states rarely used the initiative process to force 
redistricting or to pass a plan.  We offer some hypotheses as to why such differences 
might appear in the data. 
 
A. The Direct Primary 
Progressive electoral reform took different forms in different parts of the country 
at the turn of the century.  In the West where Populism ruled, the targets of reformers’ ire 
were legislatures captured by railroads and other trusts, while in the East reformers set 
their sights on corrupt, urban party machines.47  Both strains of Progressivism, however, 
pushed for adoption of the direct primary, which they saw as diminishing the power of 
party bosses as well as expanding popular participation in the political process.  We 
might expect that politicians who owed their current position, at least in part, to the 
nomination mechanism that got them there, would be reluctant to change it.  Moreover, 
the party organization might exert power over incumbents to block a reform that would 
diminish the organization’s power to select candidates.  If so, we should expect non-
initiative states to be less likely than initiative states to pass direct primary legislation.   
We do not find this to be the case.  For the most part initiative and non-initiative states 
were both very likely to pass such reforms, although in half of the initiative states direct 
primary legislation was passed through the initiative process. 
                                                 
47 Id. 
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Although states had barely begun to enact direct primary laws before 1900, all but 
three of the forty-eight states had done so by 1915.48  As before, the following table 
identifies states’ adoption of direct primary laws as of 1915 according to the presence or 
absence of the initiative process at the time the direct primary was adopted.  The three 
states that had not provided for direct primary elections—Connecticut, New Mexico, and 
Rhode Island—all lacked initiative processes as well.49  However, the presence of the 
initiative clearly was neither necessary nor sufficient for the establishment of the direct 
primary, as demonstrated by the fact that 83% of the non-initiative states passed direct 
primary laws during this period.  More revealing is the fact that the average year of 
adoption of the direct primary for non-initiative states (1907) was actually earlier than 
that for initiative states (1909).  We do not mean to make more of this than to say that 
initiative states as a group were certainly not early adopters, or at least not moreso than 
noninitiative states. 
 
                                                 
48 See ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY 19 (2002).   
49 These three states did not fall slightly behind in their reform efforts.  All three refused to create direct 
primaries for many more decades.  ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY 119 (2002). 
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Table 9. States Adopting the Direct Primary through 1915  
As of 1915: Direct Primary  Avg. Date How Passed: Initiative Used?
Yes No Total of Adoption Yes No Total
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 3             -          3             1907 1 2             3             33%
     Moderate Users 2             -          2             1909 2 -          2             100%
     Infrequent Users 3             -          3             1910 1 2             3             33%
Total Initiative States 8            -        8            1909 4            4            8            50%
Non-Initiative States 37          3            40          1907
Total 45          3            48          1907  
Of the states that provided the initiative mechanism to voters, four passed direct 
primary laws through that process.  Maine was the first state east of the Mississippi River 
to enact a process for statewide initiative, and its very first initiative to qualify for the 
ballot was a requirement that the state and counties select candidates through popular 
vote at primary elections, rather than by party conventions.50  It passed overwhelmingly 
in 1911, the only ballot measure to pass for the next twenty-five years.  
The people of Montana were immediately successful in adopting the direct 
primary; in 1912, the first time the voters used the initiative, the measure qualified and 
voters approved it.51  Likewise, reformers in Oregon (1910) and South Dakota, which 
implemented the oft-copied “Richards primary election law” (1912), instituted the 
primary through the initiative process.  In the case of South Dakota, sixty years passed 
before another statewide initiative was to pass. 
                                                 
50 See DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS (1989), summarized by the University of Southern 
California's Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org. 
51 See DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS (1989), summarized by the University of Southern 
California's Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org. 
 37
 
 While these states were able to use the initiative process directly to effect reform, 
there is evidence that the presence of the initiative had indirect influences as well.  In 
Illinois, for example, a non-binding initiative mechanism prompted the legislature to pass 
a direct primary law. The Illinois state legislature chose to limit its people to a “Public 
Opinion” procedure in 1901, which was basically an advisory or non-binding initiative 
power.  The people used this qualified power to approve a variety of measures to limit 
incumbent and party machine control, including replacement of nominating conventions 
with direct primaries, restrictions on “corrupt political practices,” and simplification of 
the complicated election ballots.  The legislature ignored all of these requests except the 
direct primary, which it passed in 1904.52  Thus, in at least one case, the initiative process 
was used to signal to the legislature an issue of public importance, on which they were 
then compelled to act.53
                                                 
52 See id. 
53 We had hoped to include a small section analyzing direct election of U.S. Senators prior to the enactment 
of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, but will relegate discussion of the issue merely to this footnote.  
Prior to enactment of that amendment several states began transferring the power to appoint U.S. Senators 
from state legislatures to the people.  Insofar as this transfer of power represents an unwelcomed limitation 
on the legislature’s power, it fits within the class of election reforms we analyze and we might assume that 
such an unwelcomed transfer (if that is what it was) would be more prevalent in states where voters could 
go around the legislature through the initiative process.   States varied considerably, however, in the means 
they employed to give voters some power to direct the legislature over its appointment of Senators. 
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth 
Amendment and its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 165, 166 (1997); 
U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, Cl.1 (amended 1913) (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one 
Vote.”).  By December of 1910, before state legislatures had convened to elect their Senators, the Boston 
Herald announced, “Fourteen out of the thirty Senators who take the oath of office at the beginning of the 
next Congress, have already been designated by popular vote.” GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 104 (1938) (quoting the Boston Herald, Dec. 26, 1910). 
However, while the senators from many states effectively were selected through a popular vote, in most 
cases it was because voters had winnowed the possible field through a direct primary the state had adopted.  
Thus, in a one-party state the voters through the primary effectively determined who the legislature would 
“select” as Senator, rubber stamping the voters’ decisions, putting them in “pretty much the same position 
as the Electoral College.”  See John S. Lapinski, Direct Election and the Emergence of the Modern Senate 
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 Thus, although adoption of the direct primary appears, in retrospect, to have been 
almost inevitable nationwide, we should not overlook the important role that the initiative 
process played in certain contexts to institute reforms that legislatures may not have been 
rushing to pass.  As with the other reforms we analyze, we should emphasize that the 
absence of systematic differences between initiative and non-initiative states does not 
prove that the initiative process was irrelevant or even unnecessary for adoption of this 
particular reform.  Unlike the other reforms in this paper, however, we were surprised to 
learn how quickly the direct primary became a fixture of the national electoral process.  
In under 15 years, the country moved from a situation where no state held party primaries 
to one where almost all did. 
 
B. Women’s Suffrage 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 (Nov. 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/programs/american/lapinskipaper.pdf.  According to Lapinski’s count, by 
1912 35 states had some form of popular control of the appointment of Senators and thirteen did not.  Id. at 
App. Table 1.  The most populist was Oregon, in which the voters through a general election chose the 
Democratic candidate and the Republican legislature obeyed their wishes and appointed him. 
 We are unsure about the direct or indirect effect of the initiative process on popular election of 
Senators.  Our uncertainty derives from sketchy data as to the effectiveness of each of these forms of 
popular constraint on legislatures as well as the relative timing of passage of the initiative, the direct 
primary and then the election of Senators.  Of the 10 initiative states that existed at the time of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 8 (80%) had some form of popular control of the process of selection of 
Senators.  Of the 38 non-initiative states, 27 (71%) utilized some form of popular control.  However,  only 
three states (to our knowledge) used the initiative process directly to bring about the popular election of 
U.S. Senators, Oregon in 1908 and Montana and Oklahoma in 1912 and each of those states had already 
adopted direct primaries.  See University of California, Initiative and Referendum Institute, Statewide 
Initiatives Since 1904 – 2000 (work in progress); see also DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE 
BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989), which is summarized in pertinent part by the University of 
Southern California’s Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/.  Thus, both sets 
of states appear to have made the transition to popular election at approximately the same rate and at the 
same time.  Legislatures seemed as willing to give up their power to appoint Senators as the people who 
were willing to take it. 
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 The women’s suffrage movement that culminated in the adoption of the 
Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 was dotted with repeated attempts to introduce 
equivalent measures at the state level, both to state legislatures as statutory proposals and 
to voters through the initiative process in states that permitted it.  In fact, some date the 
earliest days of the reform movement to well before the Civil War.54   The many well-
documented studies of equal suffrage have attributed the movement’s success to many 
factors: the growing importance of women in the workforce, the recognition that equal 
voting rights at home suited the message of democratization abroad voiced during World 
War I, and the wave of populism and progressivism that drove the adoption of much 
social reform from the post-Civil War period into the early twentieth century.  Amid 
these policy changes, of course, was the widespread adoption of the direct initiative.  The 
prolific introduction of direct democratic mechanisms into many states’ policymaking 
processes in the 1910s and the concurrent success of state-level women’s suffrage 
measures during the same decade suggest that possible relationships between the two 
developments are worth exploring. 
Insofar as equal suffrage directly threatened legislators’ reelection prospects, it 
did so by introducing some uncertainty into the electoral base of individual legislators.  
The political preferences of prospective women voters were uncertain, and one might 
expect incumbents to resist a redefinition of the electorate from one that elected them to 
one that included new voters with unknown allegiances and preferences.  Particularly 
since the adoption of equal suffrage may have spurred resistance among all-male 
                                                 
54 LEE ANN BANASZAK, WHY MOVEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL: OPPORTUNITY, CULTURE, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE (1996).  
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legislatures, thereby making statutory changes difficult,  pre-1920 state level women’s 
suffrage is a reform that we might see as having been more successful in states in which 
the initiative process was available.  For the purposes of this section, we conduct a 
descriptive analysis similar to those in the previous sections: were equal suffrage 
measures more common in states with the initiative process?  If so, were they pursued 
through the initiative process or through legislative action? 
Table 10. States Adopting Equal Suffrage for Presidential or All Elections by 1920
State-Level Equal Suffrage How Passed: Initiative Used?
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 5             -          5             2 3 5                40%
     Moderate Users 3             3             6             0 3 3                0%
     Infrequent Users 3             1             4             0 3 3                0%
Total Initiative States 11          4            15          2               9               11             18%
Concurrent Adopters* 5             5          
Non-Initiative States 10          18          28          
Total 26          22          48          
* Refers to states that adopted women's suffrage before gaining the initiative, but that did adopt the initiative process by 1920:
Includes CA, CO, ID, UT, and WA.  
 
Existing research suggests that the presence of the initiative process was not 
critical to the success of state-level equal suffrage measures.  Lee Ann Banaszak’s 
exhaustive study of the movement explains that the wave of direct democracy was far 
from complete when voters and legislators were considering state-level suffrage laws.  In 
fact, prior to 1920, the initiative process existed in only fifteen states (four of which 
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adopted equal suffrage before adopting direct legislation).55  Of the 26 states that did 
extend the franchise to women prior to 1920, eleven, or 42%, had the initiative process 
available to them at the time.  However, while the women’s suffrage movement appears 
at least as successful in states that had not adopted the initiative as in those that did, it is 
important to note that many states that did extend the franchise to women did also 
ultimately adopt the initiative process as well, but later; western states such as Wyoming, 
Colorado, Utah, and Idaho all provided equal suffrage before the turn of the twentieth 
century and then subsequently adopted the initiative process as part of the first wave of 
the direct democracy movement from 1908-1913.  The perception that state legislatures 
in these states voluntarily adopted women’s suffrage independent of the initiative 
process, then, is somewhat misleading. 
Of the states that did have the initiative process available when they were 
considering equal suffrage measures, how many actually used it?  Of the ten states with 
the initiative process that did pass a women’s suffrage measure, only two of them 
(Oregon and Arizona56, both in 1912) did so through the initiative process.  Legislatures 
in other states, such as New York, Maine, and Rhode Island in the northeast, and in 
Illinois, a state characterized at the turn of the century by strong machine politics, all 
adopted statutory provisions for equal suffrage during the same period without the 
                                                 
55 BANASZAK, supra note 51, at 180; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED 
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, App. A-18, A-19, A-20 (2000). 
56 Arizona was granted statehood in February of 1912 with a provision for the initiative process in its 
inaugural constitution.  According to contemporary accounts, suffrage activists were unable to persuade the 
first state legislature to consider adopting a statutory equal suffrage measure, and immediately pursued an 
initiative campaign which resulted in a constitutional amendment in the state’s first election that fall.  
Chapter II: Arizona, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, Vol. 6: 1900-1920 (1922); Claudette Simpson, 
Frances Munds and Arizona’s History of Suffrage, produced by the Sharlot Hall Museum Archives 
department and published by the Prescott Daily Courier (Prescott, AZ) on Mar. 22, 1998. 
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presence or pressure of the initiative process.  Moreover, at least one state similar to the 
northeastern states just mentioned, Massachusetts, and other Midwestern states such as 
Arkansas and Nebraska, were all armed with the initiative process but failed to embrace 
equal suffrage.  In all, the availability of the initiative process to proponents of women’s 
suffrage did not seem to enable reform with any more success than those that did not.   
In fact, in many states, the legislature appeared to be more progressive than the 
voters.  Eight of the states that enacted women’s suffrage laws through the legislature57 
did so after constitutional amendments were defeated at the polls.  For example, suffrage 
advocates in Oregon, one of the first adopters of direct legislation (1902), fought perhaps 
the most trying campaigns for the vote.  While the adoption of equal suffrage in 1912 
made that state one of the more progressive, it was only after five previous defeats in 
1884, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1910 that the victory was won.58  Oregon’s experience 
demonstrates that the initiative process, either as a direct mechanism for change or as an 
indirect indication of progressivism, was not a strong benchmark for the success of 
women’s suffrage. 
Similarly, in Nebraska, one of the last states west of the Mississippi River to grant 
women the right to vote, the legislature on more than one occasion had considered an 
equal suffrage amendment that it approved but then was defeated by the voters.59  An 
                                                 
57 These states are North Dakota (1917), Nebraska (1917), Rhode Island (1917), Maine (1919), Missouri 
(1919), Iowa (1919), Ohio (1919), and Wisconsin (1919).  Chronology of Women’s Suffrage Movement 
Events, at http://teacher.scholastic.com/researchtools/articlearchives/womhst/chrono.htm. 
58 Id. 
59 Nebraska’s legislature approved women’s suffrage during the constitutional convention of 1871, but the 
proposal was defeated by the state’s voters.  In 1882, a constitutional amendment granting equal suffrage 
was again endorsed by the legislature, but subsequently was defeated at the polls.  For more information on 
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initiative campaign in 1914 met a similar fate; the proposition granting equal suffrage to 
women qualified for the ballot but was defeated among the voters by about 10,000 
votes.60  Contemporary accounts attribute the failure to the strong German-Catholic 
population in the state that was guided by the Church to oppose the measure, and the 
strong opposition across the state to the prohibition movement, a movement that was 
linked closely to the suffrage proponents.61  Notwithstanding the defeat of the 1914 
proposition, encouragement by the suffragists prompted the legislature to approve partial 
women’s suffrage, permitting women to vote for municipal election and for presidential 
electors, in a new bill in 1917.  A referendum campaign by the anti-suffrage forces 
quickly formed to attempt to overturn the law, only to be thrown out in the courts in early 
1919 due to the fraudulent collection of signatures.62  By then, the legislature was 
considering the federal amendment, which it ratified unanimously.   
As a final example, in Massachusetts, which ratified the Nineteenth Amendment 
with unanimous support in both houses and which had the initiative by 1918, the defeat 
of the final push for women’s suffrage came from the voters.  After failing to pass 
suffrage laws in 1910 and 1911, the legislature approved a constitutional amendment in 
1915 that was then defeated by the voters at the polls.63  Ultimately, it was an unwilling 
electorate, and not an unresponsive legislature, that was able to stymie reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the history of women’s suffrage in Nebraska, see: 
http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0700/stories/0701_0110.html. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Bay State Defeats Suffrage by 124,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1915, at ___. 
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C. State Legislative Redistricting Prior to Baker v. Carr 
As described in our discussion of redistricting commissions above, with the power 
to draw district lines comes an effective tool for entrenching one’s preferred candidates 
and punishing their opponents.  The judiciary established a constitutional check on the 
exercise of the political branches’ redistricting power only with Baker v. Carr and the 
redistricting cases of the 1960s.  Prior to those decisions, which effectively required 
redistricting following each decennial census, states varied considerably in their 
propensity to redistrict, with some doing so regularly and others ignoring for generations 
state constitutional requirements that required the legislature to redistrict.  States also 
varied with respect to the degree of malapportionment they tolerated or encouraged in 
their legislative institutions.  Insofar as the availability of the initiative process may have 
restrained otherwise unfettered redistricting power, we might expect initiative states to 
have behaved differently with respect to pre-Baker redistricting.  In non-initiative states 
the voters arguably had no means of forcing legislatures to update their districts as the 
population shifted.  Conversely, perhaps in initiative states the “people” took advantage 
of the opportunity to circumvent their legislators so as to force them to redistrict more 
frequently or to tolerate a lesser degree of malapportionment. 
Indeed, as the tables below suggest, we find that initiative states were somewhat 
less malapportioned and that they redistricted more recently before Baker.  The “average 
vote to control” measure below indicates the percent of the population in a given region 
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whose votes are needed in order to control a majority of the districts in 1962.64  The 
lower the percent, the more grossly malapportioned the districts.  On average, in initiative 
states, districts comprising 32.3 percent of the population could elect a majority in the 
lower house of the state legislature, while districts comprising 30.7 percent of the 
population could elect a majority in the upper house of the state legislature.  In contrast, 
the average vote to control for initiative states was 35.5 percent for the lower house (a 3.2 
point difference) and 31.0 percent for the upper house (a 0.3 point difference).  (Similar 
differences exist for the median states, except that the greater difference occurs among 
the upper houses.) 
Although the average degree of malapportionment in the two classes of states 
differed slightly, the average date of their most recent redistricting preceding Baker 
differed considerably.  Three quarters of initiative states reapportioned their legislatures 
in the 1950s, while only half of non-initiative states reapportioned their lower houses and 
41 percent reapportioned their upper houses during that period.  The average initiative 
state redistricted in late 1948 and the median state redistricted in 1951.  In contrast, often 
despite state constitutions and statutes requiring periodic reapportionment, non-initiative 
states, on average, had redistricted their lower houses in 1934 and their upper houses in 
late 1933:  a 14 and 15 year difference.  However, the median state redistricted its lower 
house in 1950 and its upper house in 1943: a one and eight year difference respectively.  
The data illustrate that several outliers among non-initiative states “drag” down their 
average year of pre-Baker redistricting.  For example, Vermont was the worst among 
                                                 
64 Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and 
Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2002). 
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non-initiative states: it had not reapportioned its legislature since 1793 when it ratified its 
Constitution.65
 
Table 11. Average Vote to Control, 1962 Pre-1962 Last Apportionment
Lower House Upper House Lower House Upper House
Initiative States
     Frequent Users 35.2% 30.1% 1950.1 1950.1
     Moderate Users 34.7% 34.2% 1947.7 1947.8
     Infrequent Users 36.8% 28.7% 1947.9 1947.2
Total Initiative States  35.5% 31.0% 1948.9 1948.8
Non-Initiative States 32.3% 30.7% 1934.0 1933.7
Difference 3.2% 0.3% 14.9 15.1  
 
Table 12. Measures of Malapportionment in State Legislatures prior to Baker v. Carr
Average Vote to Control Measure Year of Last Apportionment
Lower House Upper House Lower House Upper House
Init. States Non-Init. Init. States Non-Init. Init. States Non-Init. Init. States Non-Init.
Median 35.3% 34.5% 33.9% 30.3% 1951 1950 1951 1943
Standard Deviation 8.5% 10.7% 12.4% 10.2% 9.9           34.1         9.8           32.3         
% Reapportioning in 1950s 76% 52% 76% 41%  
 
 Despite the fact that initiative states seemed to be slightly better apportioned in 
1962 than non-initiative states and had reapportioned more recently, there is only scant 
evidence that the initiative process played a direct role in the reapportionment process.  
Until 1962, there were only six attempts to introduce reapportionment requirements 
through the initiative process; three succeeded.66  In addition, there were ten attempts to 
                                                 
65 Margaret Greenfield et al., Legislative Reapportionment: California in National Perspective, 1959 LEGIS. 
PROBS ___. 
66 These states were Arizona (1918), California (1926), and Michigan (1952). Initiative and Referendum 
Institute, Statewide Initiatives Since 1904-2000, at  
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use the initiative process actually to conduct a state legislative redistricting exercise; three 
of the four that succeeded were statutory initiative measures, one of which the legislature 
overturned in the following session.67  Ironically, the people of Colorado specifically 
approved through a referendum a malapportioned redistricting plan, which the Supreme 
Court nevertheless struck down in a companion case to Reynolds v. Sims.68
 Thus, although it is possible that the presence or threat of an initiative motivated 
some states to redistrict, other factors may provide a fuller explanation of the differences 
we observe in the data.  Those factors might include the year of entry of a state into the 
Union or, as in the reforms discussed above, a correlation between presence of the 
initiative and a political culture supportive of good government reforms.  Given that 
initiative states, in general, were relative latecomers to the Union, their first redistricting 
naturally took place later than other states and they were less likely to develop a tradition 
of acquiescence to static district lines, and perhaps did not have as large population shifts 
between censuses.  Also, maybe the political competitiveness of a state or the existence 
of divided government might determine the extent of a state’s malapportionment or its 
propensity to redistrict.  If one party dominates either a state’s government or voting 
population, perhaps we should not expect much redistricting reform initiated either from 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Historical/State
wide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf. 
67 For example, the 1956 statutory initiative in Washington represented the culmination of a decade-long 
battle between the League of Women Voters and the legislature in that state, and, as a statutory measure, 
did not pass through the legislature first.  Once it passed, the legislature modified the law in the next 
session by creating new district boundaries in order to dilute the effect of the original initiative.  In this 
state, then, the absence of a direct legislation mechanism allowing for constitutional revision allowed the 
legislature to retain control over reapportionment despite statutory efforts to the contrary. 
68 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  See Lucas v. Forty Fourth General Assembly, Error! Main Document 
Only.377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
 48
 
secure politicians in non-initiative states or from voters in initiative states who do not 
view their representative institutions as particularly warped.  With all that said, we do 
notice some differences between these two categories of states so we should not rule out 
the possibility that the availability of the initiative had some effect. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 We have been careful in this article not to overstate the significance of our 
findings.  We do not think we have found systematic trends to suggest that election 
reform, in general, is more likely in initiative states.  However, certain types of laws, such 
as term limits, seem unimaginable without the initiative as an open avenue for changing 
election laws, and we have dug up many other examples of particular reforms for which 
the initiative played an essential role.  In some cases, the effect of the initiative is direct – 
meaning that voters pass election reform measures at the polls – but often it is indirect, 
with legislators acting under threat of an initiative.  However, in most cases, even in 
initiative states, it is legislatures, not voters, who pass the various election reforms we 
analyze.  We tried to disentangle whether such reforms arose from initiative threats or 
from other sources, cultural or otherwise.  All we can conclude at this stage is that the 
initiative can sometimes be an absolute prerequisite for the passage of electoral reforms 
opposed by recalcitrant incumbents.  However, legislatures will often pass such reforms 
on their own, even though in some cases such reforms may not be as reformist as they 
would be had the voters proposed them.   
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In the end, we paint a mixed picture with respect to the effect of direct democracy 
on election reform.  However, this mixed picture we think questions the strong claims 
that are often made about legislative capture inhibiting election reform.  The initiative 
may provide an avenue of reform that under certain circumstances could allow reform-
minded voters to get around obstructionist, self-interested tactics of their legislators.  In 
the end, however, we think much work remains to be done to identify properly the 
sources for the differences that distinguish each state’s election law regimes. 
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